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Social network analysisThis paper investigates how three aspects of governance systems, namely the policy context, the inﬂuence of key
agents and their discursive practices, are affecting national-level processes of policy design aimed at REDD+,
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conserva-
tion, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. We
conducted analysis in six REDD+ countries (Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam).
The paper combines three methods: policy analysis, media-based discourse analysis and policy network analysis.
The paper shows that policies bothwithin and outside the forestry sector that support deforestation and forest deg-
radation create pathdependencies and entrenched interests that hamper policy change. In addition,most dominant
policy coalitions do not challenge business-as-usual trajectories, reinforcing existing policy and political structures.
Nominority policy coalitions are directly tackling the root causes of deforestation and forest degradation, that is, the
politico-economic conditions driving them. Instead they focus on environmental justice issues, such as calls for in-
creased participation of indigenous people in decision-making. Only in two of the six countries are these transfor-
mational change coalitions vocal enough to be heard, yet to exercise their agency effectively and to support more
substantial reforms, these coalitions would need the participation of more inﬂuential policy actors, particularly
state agencies that have the authority to make binding decisions about policy. Furthermore, discourses supporting
transformational change would need to be reﬂected in institutional practices and policy decisions.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in
developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainablemanage-
ment of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing
countries (REDD+), requires substantial policy change and gover-
nance reform (Angelsen et al., 2009a; Corbera and Schroeder,
2011; Kanninen et al., 2008; Luttrell et al., 2011). The concept of re-
ducing emissions from deforestation was ﬁrst proposed at the 11th
Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC COP 11; Montreal, 2005) by a group of countries led
by Papua NewGuinea and Costa Rica. Themain idea of REDD+ is to pro-
vide positive ﬁnancial incentives to countries to reduce emissions
through avoideddeforestation and forest degradation, and to compensaterest Governance.
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itself has changed over time (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). To qualify
for ﬁnancial compensation under the UNFCCC, countries have to formu-
late (and implement) national REDD+ strategies.
REDD+ governance encompasses a range of institutions, organisa-
tions, principles, norms, mechanisms and decision-making procedures.
Governance-related questions in the literature concern the appropriate-
ness of ﬁnancial mechanisms, the allocation of and access to REDD+
beneﬁts, the effectiveness of monitoring systems, and ‘good gover-
nance’ principles such as transparency, accountability and legitimacy
(Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012; Biermann et al., 2009; Corbera and
Schroeder, 2011; Kanowski et al., 2011; Karsenty, 2008; Karsenty and
Ongolo, 2012; Vatn and Vedeld, 2012). The governance of national-
level REDD+, as in other ﬁelds of environmental governance, involves
a range of more or less powerful state and non-state actors that operate
in country-speciﬁc political structures and employ multiple mecha-
nisms to realise their interests and ideas (Bulkeley and Newell, 2010;
Cashore, 2002; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Lemos and Agrawal,
2006). Following Lemos and Agrawal (2006: 298), we understand envi-
ronmental governance as a system, in which political actors try to inﬂu-
ence policy actions and outcomes through the system's regulatory
processes, mechanisms and organisations.
In this paper, we explore how three key elements of governance,
namely the interaction of policy actors, the structures (policy pathved.
tional REDD+: An analysis of the power of agency, Forest Policy and
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mechanisms they employ (discourses and discursive practices used in
coalition building), in different countries likely enable or constrain ef-
fective REDD+ policy-making aimed at moving away from business-
as-usual trajectories towards transformational change (Brockhaus and
Angelsen, 2012; Di Gregorio et al., 2012a). We focus on the national-
level policy domain, because this is the scale atwhich REDD+strategies
are emerging.
Our aim in investigating the relationship between these three key
aspects of REDD+ governance is to assess the power of agency in
REDD+ policy-making in six national contexts. The paper addresses
two key questions: 1) to what extent do policy discourses on REDD+
challenge existing business-as-usual scenarios of deforestation and call
for transformational change? and 2) what is the likely inﬂuence of the
coalitions formed around these discourses? Using these questions, we as-
sess the extent towhich dominant andminority policy coalitions exercise
agency and the implications for realising REDD+.
We explore these questions by presenting a comparative analysis of
six countries (Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea
(PNG) and Vietnam). These countries are at different stages in the forest
transition and represent all three major tropical regions (Angelsen and
Rudel, 2013). The paper combines a policy analysis investigating the
path dependencies of the policy context as well as a media-based dis-
course analysis and a policy network analysis, which are used to identify
features of dominant and minority discourse coalitions.
We begin by presenting a brief theoretical framework of how actors,
structures (policy and political path dependencies) and mechanisms
(discursive practices) are related and how they interact in the context
of national REDD+ processes. This is followed by a description of the
research design and methods. The Results and discussion section ﬁrst
investigates the extent to which existing national policies enable or
hinder REDD+and create path dependencies. It then analyses the inﬂu-
ence of the actors behind the dominant policy discourses that either
reinforce existing structures or challenge them. In the conclusion, we
discuss possible implications for policy change.
2. Theoretical framework: Structures, agents and mechanisms
What can inﬂuence the ability of national REDD+ strategies and
policy processes to move from business-as-usual trajectories towards
transformational change? Here, transformational change is deﬁned as
‘a shift in discourse, attitudes, power relations, and deliberate policy
and protest action that leads policy formulation and implementation
away from business as usual policy approaches that directly or indirect-
ly support deforestation and forest degradation’ (Biermann et al., 2012;
Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012: 16–17)? We include under business-as
usual, discursive practices that avoid tackling these causes in national
policy and indications of lack of call for policy action in this regard —
or ‘political inaction’ (Bell, 1994: 59). We focus on three elements of
governance: 1) the structural conditions in REDD+policy arenas formed
by institutional and policy path dependencies; 2) the agents operating
in and constituting these arenas, their interests and their power in pur-
suing them; and 3) the mechanisms these agents employ to inﬂuence
the outcomes of REDD+ policy processes, such as their discursive
practices (Angelsen et al., 2012; Di Gregorio et al., 2012a; Lemos and
Agrawal, 2006). In the rest of this section, we discuss these elements
in the context of REDD+.
Institutions, including policies, regulations, rules and norms, are
established over time and, in many countries, have led to institutional
path dependencies in policy formulation that represent political and
policy structures that encourage deforestation and forest degradation.
These structures, which favour extractive forest and land use policies,
are supported and constituted by powerful actors, either individually
or organised in coalitions, and are of beneﬁt to numerous actors in the
polity (Luttrell et al., 2012; Mehlum et al., 2006; Ross, 1999). Further-
more, these structures can be reinforced by rent-seeking behaviour,Please cite this article as: Brockhaus, M., et al., Governing the design of na
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sector (Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012; Ross, 2001).
‘Power’ in this context refers to the ability of actors to inﬂuence for-
estry and land use decisions such that the outcomes of these decision
processes serve their interests (Biermann, 2010). Power here is under-
stood as inherently relational and it goes beyond the Weberian ideal
of the state as main actor (Foucault, 1980) to encompass a variety of ac-
tors. The power of political actors in forest governance has many differ-
ent facets, and has been analysed and theorised in multiple ways (for a
more exhaustive review of power in forest governance, see Krott et al.,
2013, this issue). In this paper, the focus is on a reputational measure
of power, based on the assessment of inﬂuence of each actor by all
other policy domain actors (Kriesi et al., 2006: 347). This measure can
reveal the actual power relations amongst actors and their potential
ability to inﬂuence policy outcomes.
Since the Montreal Conference of Parties in 2005 and increasingly
after the REDD+ took centre stage in global climate change debates in
Bali in 2007, forest-rich countries have seen the entry of new policy
actors cooperating or competing to realise diverse interests around
REDD+. These actors include businesses targeting carbon and ‘green’
investments, state agencies working on ecosystem services provi-
sion and licensing, and groups representing indigenous and forest-
dependent communities. These actors seek to inﬂuence REDD+ policy
processes at all levels of governance, from the global to the local level,
and at different stages of the policy processes, from the formulation to
the implementation of national REDD+ strategies (Schroeder, 2010).
As a result, a new agency for the value of ‘standing forest’ is emerging,
incorporating both old and new actors and interests (Brockhaus and
Angelsen, 2012; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Schroeder, 2010). Fol-
lowing Biermann (2010), we understand agents as actors that have
the capacity and the legitimacy to exercise power, where legitimacy
is achieved by obtaining, formally or informally, the consent of the
governed.
These actors use argumentation to advance their interests and ideas.
These discursive practices are a keymechanism for gaining consent and
framing policy discourses in a way that reﬂects the interests and beliefs
of speciﬁc policy actors (Jasanoff, 2009), and are key features of the gov-
ernancemechanisms bywhichpolicy processes are negotiated (Benford
and Snow, 2000; Bulkeley, 2000; Hajer, 1995). Discourse is critical in
public policy-making because it shapes howa policy problem is perceived
and, consequently, what kinds of solutions are conceivable or could be
considered the ‘right’ choice (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). Multiple dis-
courses about a single policy problemcan co-exist and provide competing
claims about what the policy problem is about, who is to blame and how
the problem can be solved (Hajer, 1993). Actors then build coalitions
around speciﬁc understandings of REDD+, which is a strategic mecha-
nism to express agency in the REDD+ policy domain. Coalition building
allows not only powerful but also marginalised actors to pool their re-
sources and voices, engage together in policy arenas and try to inﬂuence
decisions, as has been observed in international REDD+ negotiations
(Schroeder, 2010).
A discourse coalition achieves dominance in a policy arena if it fulﬁls
three conditions: 1) central actors are persuaded and adopt the new
discourse; this condition, which Hajer (1993) calls ‘discourse structura-
tion’, states that the more inﬂuential the members of a discourse coali-
tion are, themore likely the coalitionwill be dominant; 2) the discourse
coalition includes key state actors, because they have binding authority
to make policy decisions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Laumann
and Knoke, 1987); and 3) institutional practices incorporate this dis-
course, that is, policy processes reﬂect the ideas of this discourse;
Hajer (1993) calls this condition ‘discursive institutionalisation’.
Multiple agentswith distinct interests, ideas and information are in a
constant struggle to inﬂuence the reconstitution of institutions and the
institutionalisation of discursive practices and ideas (Jessop, 2001).
Hence, the classical divide between actors' agency and social and political
structures dissolves with the use of discursive practices as an interactivetional REDD+: An analysis of the power of agency, Forest Policy and
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Giddens, 1984). The relationship between structure and agency then be-
comes amatter of empirical investigation (Fuller, 1998; Hay andWincott,
1998).
In this paper, the investigation takes the form of a comparative anal-
ysis of this relationship in the national REDD+ governance systems of
Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, PNG and Vietnam. We argue that
country-speciﬁc political structures (including institutional and policy
path dependencies and power hierarchies) and agency (expressed
through discourse coalitions), amongst other factors, co-determine
the emergence and nature of national REDD+ strategies and outcomes.
The outcomes reﬂect the extent towhich policy decisions leave the status
quo unchallenged, or support and reinforce the structures that enable
deforestation and forest degradation and thereby constrain effective
REDD+ policy-making, or challenge and transform existing structures
in favour of forest conservation and restoration.3 In all countries except Vietnam, it was possible to interview only a subset of organisa-
tions from the complete list, with response rates between 55% (Indonesia, which also had
the largest list of 115 actors) and 87% (Brazil, with 56 out of 64 actors).
4 A key step in policy network analysis concerns the boundary deﬁnition of the policy
domain. We deﬁne the REDD+ policy domain as the ‘substantive focus of concern of pol-
icy initiatives and debate’ around REDD+ in a speciﬁc country (Laumann and Knoke,3. Research design and methods
The analysis uses amulti-method comparative research design aimed
at investigating the structural conditions (policy and political path depen-
dencies), the actors' (reputational) power and the discursive practices
they employ, all of which shape the REDD+ policy domain. Three re-
search design components were undertaken in each country (Brockhaus
and Di Gregorio, 2012).
The ﬁrst component, undertaken at the start of the study, was a
country-level policy analysis that investigated the contextual conditions
and structural features of national governance systems.1 Drawing on lit-
erature reviews and semi-structured interviewswith REDD+policy ac-
tors, it included a politico-economic analysis of governance aspects and
the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Babon and Gowae,
2013; Dkamela, 2010; Hosonuma et al., 2012; Indrarto et al., 2012;
May et al., 2011b; Paudel et al., 2013; Pham et al., 2012a).
The second componentwas a content analysis of printmedia articles
on REDD+ published in the three leading newspapers in each country
(those with the highest circulation and representing diverse political
positions) between2005 and2010,whichwere used to identify discourse
coalitions.2 The focus of the present analysis is on policy actors' reported
position statements (or stances) on REDD+,whichwere coded to identi-
fy discursive frames – of ‘schemata of interpretation… [that enable indi-
viduals] to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ a situation (Goffman, 1974:
21) – following a predeﬁned codebook (Babon et al., 2012; Cronin and
Santoso, 2010; Kengoum, 2011; Khatri et al., 2012; May et al., 2011a;
Pham, 2011). In a subsequent round of open coding, these stances were
grouped into broader discourse categories (or master frames, which are
broader frames in terms of ‘interpretative scope, inclusivity, ﬂexibility
and cultural resonances’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 619) that subsume a
number of distinct organization-speciﬁc frames). This procedure was
followed to categorize policy actors into distinct discourse coalitions
(Benford and Snow, 2000; Bulkeley, 2000; Cronin et al., 2012; Pham
et al., 2012b). We distinguished two categories of master frames in each
country: one reﬂecting resistance to change (business as usual or BAU),
and the other challenging current practices of deforestation and forest
degradation (transformational change or TC). This is a simpliﬁcation of
what BAU and TC frames actually represent: two extremes on a continu-
um of frames that are shaped by incentives, discursive practices and1 For comparability, all country teams followed a common detailed method guide indi-
cating the areas to be investigated including politico-economicaspects andpast andpresent
policies (Brockhaus et al., 2012a).
2 For comparability, all country teams used the same predeﬁned code book, which was
translated into the national language. There were three levels of coding: the ﬁrst uniquely
identiﬁed the media articles; the second identiﬁed the main frames in the articles (main
topic and type of frame); and the third identiﬁed further characteristics of the frames in
more detail, including the identiﬁcation of the position statements (stances) on REDD+
of up to four policy actorsmentioned in the articles. These stances are themainmedia data
source for this paper (Di Gregorio et al., 2012b).
Please cite this article as: Brockhaus, M., et al., Governing the design of na
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for each category (BAU and TC), we then analysed the discourse coalition
whose views were most represented in the media (highest incidence of
stances).
The third component was a policy network analysis undertaken in
each country between 2010 and 2012 (Bushley, 2012; Gebara et al.,
2012; Kengoum, 2012; McIntire et al., 2012; Moeliono et al., 2012,
2013; Pham, 2012). In this paper, we use interviewees' replies to the
question: ‘Please indicate those organisations that stand out as especial-
ly inﬂuential on domestic REDD policies.’ Respondents answered this
question by selecting from a complete list of the policy domain's organi-
zational actors3 each organisation that they considered ‘especially inﬂu-
ential’.4 From these data, we built a reputational network of inﬂuence
that we used to assess the level of inﬂuence of discourse coalitions
(Brandes et al., 1999; Knoke, 1998; Kriesi et al., 2006).
Nodes in the network represent actors and the directed ties indicate
the perception that an actor is inﬂuential. We used indegree, a clas-
sical social network analysis measure of centrality, to assess inﬂu-
ence (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).5 The higher the number of
incoming ties, the higher the indegree.We then classiﬁed organisations
into nine categories – state actors; national research institutes; domes-
tic NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs); domestic business; in-
ternational NGOs; intergovernmental organisations and international
research organisations; foreign or multinational businesses; foreign
government agencies; and others (mainly individuals without an insti-
tutional afﬁliation) – and calculated the indegrees per actor category.
Drawing on Kriesi et al. (2006), we calculated reputational power in-
dices for each actor category by dividing the total number of indegrees
per category by the number of all possible ties the actor category
could have received:
Rp ¼
Xnp
i¼1idi
np n−1ð Þ
where Rp denotes the reputational power index R of actor category p,
and p = 1, 2,…, 9; idi denotes the indegree of actors i, with i belonging
to actor category p; and np represents the number of actors in actor cat-
egory pwhere n denotes the number of actors interviewed.6
In a second step, we applied the reputational power index to the
composition of each discourse coalition identiﬁed in themedia analysis.
The reputational power of a discourse coalition is equal to:
Rd ¼
Xj
p¼1
Rp mpd
where Rd denotes the reputational power index R of discourse coalition
d andmpd equals the number of stances of actors that belong to category
denotes the reputational power index R of discourse coalition d andmpd
equals the number of stances of actors that belong to category p that are1987: 9–10). Domainmembers are organisations that deﬁne themselves and that are per-
ceived by others as a part of the national policy domain (Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 251).
Information from the media analysis, literature sources and researchers' expertise was
used to compile a preliminary list of actors, which was then reﬁned and validated by a
panel of experts representing different policy actor categories.
5 The sum of an actor's column in the adjacency matrix (incoming ties) divided by all
possible ties in the network gives an actor's indegree: id j ¼∑ni¼1
xij
n−1 with i ≠ j.
6 Dividing the indegrees of the actors in a speciﬁc actor category by the total number of
possible indegrees based on the number of interviewed actors makes it possible to make
comparisons across actor categories (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) and take into account
the varying response rates between countries.
tional REDD+: An analysis of the power of agency, Forest Policy and
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tion with the highest Rd value fulﬁls the ﬁrst condition of a dominant
coalition: the coalition is themost vocal and its actors are more inﬂuen-
tial than those of the other discourse coalitions identiﬁed.
Finally, to compare the relative power of discourse coalitions within
each country, we normalise the sum of the reputational power index of
the main BAU and TC discourse coalitions to 1:
RBAUnorm þ RTCnorm ¼ 1
where RBAUnorm ¼ RBAURBAUþRTC and RTCnorm ¼
RTC
RBAUþRTC.
Thus, for example, if the score of RBAU norm is bigger than 0.5, then the
BAU coalition is likely more inﬂuential than the TC coalition. In other
words, the BAU coalition fulﬁls the ﬁrst condition (discursive structura-
tion) of a dominant coalition.
All data collection was undertaken between 2010 and 2012, when all
countries in this study were in what is called Readiness Phase (Angelsen
and McNeill, 2012; Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen, 2009; Angelsen
et al., 2009b). Some limitations of the methods need to be highlighted.
First, different response rates to the policy network survey affect the
level of the power index across countries (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
However, in the paper, we only compare power indices between coali-
tions within countries. In other words, we cannot say that, for example,
the BAU discourse coalition in Indonesia is more powerful than that in
Vietnam, but we can say that the relative strength of the BAU coalition
compared with the TC coalition is slightly greater in Indonesia than that
in Vietnam. Also, the power indicators refer to the conditions at the
time of the survey, which are likely to change over time. Second, using
media data to determine discourse coalitions has limitations, as not all
policy actors use themedia to state their claims. In particular, private busi-
nesses were not well represented in most countries. Furthermore, in
Nepal, state actors were less vocal in themedia, which can be interpreted
as a strength of CSOs, but could also create a bias in favour of other actors
that use print media much more actively. We therefore interpret the re-
sults as indicative only.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Policies hindering and enabling change
There is wide consensus that national REDD+ policy formulation
has been developing at a much slower pace than initially expected
(Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). To investigate the structural con-
straints and opportunities arising from the policy and political con-
text, we analysed cross-sectoral policy impacts, implementation deﬁcits
and forestry and REDD+ policy developments (Table 1). To do this, we
startedwith themain drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. Ag-
riculture (large or small scale) and legal and illegal commercial logging
are the leading drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in all coun-
tries studied except Brazil, where cattle-ranching is themain driver of de-
forestation (Table 1).Mining, infrastructure development and population
movements and policies (migration and resettlements) also have direct
impacts on deforestation and forest degradation (Table 1) (Babon and
Gowae, 2013; Dkamela, 2010; Hosonuma et al., 2012; Indrarto et al.,
2012; May et al., 2011b; Paudel et al., 2013; Pham et al., 2012a). There
are also indirect impacts linked to tax and trade regimes, monetary pol-
icy and foreign debt (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998). Consequently,
to assess structural policy constraints, we need to take into account
cross-sectoral linkages and policy impacts (Dubé and Schmithűsen,
2003, 2007). For example, forest conversion is facilitated by tax regimes
and economic development strategies, such as tax exemptions for food
and energy estate development and the pulp and paper industry in In-
donesia and, in the past, for cattle-ranching in some parts of Brazil
(Brockhaus et al., 2012b; Indrarto et al., 2012; May et al., 2011b). In ad-
dition, political aims of self-sufﬁciency in food and cash cropPlease cite this article as: Brockhaus, M., et al., Governing the design of na
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sion (Pacheco et al., 2012), as has occurred in Vietnam. An indirect
effect of the currency devaluation in Cameroon was a boom in tim-
ber exports (Dkamela, 2010). Furthermore, in Brazil, Vietnam, Nepal
and Cameroon, infrastructure development, such as plans for new
roads and hydropower plants, is contributing to deforestation. In PNG,
although plantations are responsible for only low levels of deforesta-
tion, the aim of the National Agriculture Development Plan is to sub-
stantially increase oil palm cultivation in the future; accompanying
this plan is the current boom in ‘virtual’ oil palm: Special Agricultural
and Business Leases are being exploited as a means of gaining permis-
sion for logging with little evidence of commitment to later undertake
the promised agricultural development (Babon and Gowae, 2013)
(Table 1).
Cross-sectoral coordination is notoriously challenging and requires in-
clusive policy networks – regular and reciprocated interactions across
stakeholder from different sectors –, procedural changes in decision-
making (e.g. participatory processes) and improved information ex-
changes across sectors (Dubé and Schmithűsen, 2003; Rethemeyer,
2007). Yet themain constraint on cross-sectoral coordination is political
in nature. Over time, the institutionalisation of past policies leads to the
formation of powerful interest groups (political structures) in speciﬁc
sectors that resist change. Policy actors then tend to become ‘inwardly
focused’ and see policy coordination as ‘threatening to the current status
quo’ (Shannon, 2003: 145).
Absence of policies or failure to implement them effectively can also
hamper transformational change, as in Nepal, where the lack of an ef-
fective land use policy is impeding REDD+ policy formulation and im-
plementation (Paudel et al., 2013). In other cases, policies that would
otherwise support REDD+ are not enforced, as in the case of sustainable
forest management regulations in PNG and ineffective efforts to combat
illegal logging in Cameroon, Indonesia and Vietnam (Babon and Gowae,
2013; Dkamela, 2010; Indrarto et al., 2012; Pham et al., 2012a). Even in
Brazil, weak enforcement is reducing the effectiveness of an otherwise
very advanced forest tenure framework that recognises particular indig-
enous rights to land and forest resources. On paper, PNG forest resources
are controlled by customary institutions and informed consent is a
requirement for any agreement with external actors; in reality, how-
ever, the process is often abused and inadequate knowledge and po-
litical resources undermine the effectiveness of these institutional
arrangements. Implementation deﬁcits often arise because of the lack
of political support. Failure to enforce and implement policies also has
substantial equity implications (Di Gregorio et al., 2013; Luttrell et al.,
in press).
On the positive side, some policies preceding or not strictly related to
REDD+ create enabling conditions for REDD+ policies. These include
forest conservation, certiﬁcation of forest products and land use planning
policies that incorporate environmental sustainability objectives. In
particular, experience with policies on payments for environmental ser-
vices in Brazil and Vietnam has laid a solid foundation for REDD+ policy
formulation (Bartels et al., 2010; Pham et al., 2012a) — perhaps to be
expected, given that successful policy-making is most often the result of
long-term experimentation and learning (Ostrom, 1999). Enabling poli-
cies that have proven successful go on to create their own path depen-
dencies and weaken BAU coalitions, thus facilitating the transition
towards more effective – and often equitable – REDD+ policy develop-
ments. This process has emerged most clearly in Brazil and particu-
larly Nepal, where a long history of community forestry has led to
very well-organised and outspoken civil society (Acharya, 2002).
Finally, all the countries have, or are in the process of establishing, new
institutions, bodies and policies aimed at developing and implementing
REDD+ (Table 1). However, failure to address cross-sectoral policy
impacts, the political power structures reinforcing path dependen-
cies leading to deforestation and forest degradation and the related
shortcomings in implementation will undermine efforts to achieve
transformational change. Although path dependencies linked totional REDD+: An analysis of the power of agency, Forest Policy and
Table 1
Drivers of deforestation and policies hindering and enabling change.
Country Drivers of deforestation
and forest degradation
Policies and operational tools that clash with
REDD+ aims
Policies that could support REDD+ Bodies and policy milestones associated with
REDD+
Indonesia Agriculture (large scale
including forest
plantations such as oil
palm, small scale,
subsistence); logging;
mining
Tax dependence on forest and mining; tax
breaks for forest products, farming produce,
pulp and paper; mining permits in protected
areas; ﬁscal and non-ﬁscal concessions for
food estate and energy estate development;
biofuel development; land allocation for oil
palm plantations
(1990) Law on Conservation of Natural
Resources and Ecosystems; (1994) Law on
Ratiﬁcation of UNFCCC; (2009) Law on
Environmental Protection and Management;
(2011) Master Plan for Acceleration and
Expansion of Economic Development for
2011–2025; (2012) Ministry of Forestry
Regulation on Guidelines on Natural
Environmental Services Business
(2007) Indonesian Forest Climate Alliance;
(2008) establishment of National Climate
Change Council; (2009) Indonesian Climate
Change Trust Fund; Ministry of Forestry
Regulation 68/2008 on REDD; (2009)
Ministry of Forestry Decree 36 Carbon
Sequestration Licences; UN-REDD; (2010)
Letter of Intent with Norway; REDD+ Task
Force; (2011) Presidential Regulations No. 61
and 71 on GHG Emission Inventory and
National Action Plan for Reducing GHG
Emissions; (2010) establishment of REDD+
Task Force; REDD+ pilot province (Central
Kalimantan); national strategy and public
consultation; (2011) moratorium on new
licences in natural primary forest and
peatland governance; R-PP approved/grant
signed
Vietnam Agriculture;
infrastructure; logging;
ﬁre; shifting cultivation;
migration
Infrastructure (roads and hydropower);
self-sufﬁciency in food and cash crop
development (rubber and coffee); National
Socio-Economic Development Plan; credit
schemes to alleviate poverty; land allocation;
economic development as main goal of
Forest Development Strategy
Decision 380 and Decree 99; payment for
forest environmental services including
beneﬁt-sharing regulation (strong design,
weak implementation); Law on Forest
Protection and Development 2004 and Land
Law 2003: legal foundation for carbon rights
(2009) National REDD network and technical
working groups, UN-REDD; (2010) National
Climate Change Strategy and National REDD
programme; (2011) National MRV
framework endorsed, R-PP resubmitted
Brazil Ranching; agriculture
(large and small scale);
infrastructure; selective
logging; mining; ﬁre
Rural credit for cattle-ranching (although
more limited than in the past) and
infrastructure development (roads and
dams); poor enforcement of tenure rules
Forest Code conservation requirement on
private land; improved enforcement of land
use policies (including protected areas);
economic and ecological zoning; efforts to
certify producer legality commercial chains
(beef, soy); land regularisation process and
demarcation of indigenous land; real-time
monitoring of deforestation
(2008) Brazil Amazon Fund and National
Plan on Climate Change; (2010) NAMA
includes REDD; (2011) Mato Grosso state bill
on REDD; (2011) National REDD+ Strategy
formulation
Cameroon Agriculture (medium and
small scale, subsistence);
logging; mining
Currency devaluation boosting logging
exports; infrastructure (roads, rail and
dams); mining and large-scale agriculture
projects
Law No. 2011/08 on Guidelines for Territorial
Planning and Sustainable Development in
Cameroon
(2009): REDD Cameroon pilot steering
committee; (2009) National Observatory on
Climate Change; (2011) UN-REDD
Programme; (2012) R-PP submitted
Nepal Agriculture; illegal
logging; resettlement;
infrastructure; ﬁre
Agricultural modernisation and associated
infrastructure development; hydropower
development; local road construction;
mining of sand, boulders and stone; lack of
overarching land use policy
Subsidies for kerosene, biogas, micro-hydro,
solar and improved cooking stoves;
community forestry programme
(2009) Establishment of REDD cell and
working group; R-PP ﬁnalised; UN-REDD
Programme; (2010) proposed amendment
to Forestry Act; (2011) R-PP grant signed
PNG Commercial logging;
subsistence agriculture;
clearing for plantations;
mining; forest ﬁres
Low and unequal levels of development and
reliance on forestry sector to provide basic
services (roads, health, education) in rural
areas; Forest Clearance Authorities granted
as part of Special Agriculture and Business
Leases; National Agriculture Development
Plan (2007–2016) promoting expansion of
palm oil industry;
Customary land ownership; informed
consent for Forest Management Agreements
(but not enforced); Forestry and Climate
Change Framework for Action 2009–2015;
2010 Climate-Compatible Development
Strategy (carbon neutrality by 2050); Papua
New Guinea Development Strategic Plan
2010–2030 includes sustainable forest
management
(2008) R-PIN submission; (2009) UN-REDD
Programme; REDD+MRV; (2010) National
Climate Change Committee and Technical
Working Groups
Abbreviations: GHG: greenhouse gases;MRV:Measuring, Reporting and Veriﬁcation;NAMA:Nationally AppropriateMitigation Actions; R-PIN: Readiness Plan IdeaNote; R-PP: Readiness
Preparation Proposal; UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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that impede change, policy coalitions are actively engaged in both
breaking up and reinforcing these very path dependencies, as discussed
in the next section.
4.2. Discourse coalitions in the media: Resisting or arguing for change
Various discourse coalitions are active in policy domains. Some reﬂect
existing structures, whereas others seek transformation and new direc-
tions for policy. Coalitions are composed of a variety of actors and coalesce
around a common discourse (Hajer, 1995). In each country, we identiﬁed
between ﬁve and 11 master frames that bring together these coalitions.
Fewer master frames were identiﬁed in countries with relatively lit-
tle REDD+ media coverage – Nepal (6), Cameroon (5) and Vietnam
(8)– andmore in countrieswith greater coverage— Indonesia (11), Brazil
(11) andPNG(10). In Table 2,we list themost vocal BAUandTCdiscoursePlease cite this article as: Brockhaus, M., et al., Governing the design of na
Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.07.003coalitions, with a breakdown of the types of policy actors represented
in each. BAUmaster frames represent themes that, although broadly sup-
portive of REDD+(in the countries studied,most policy coalitions are os-
tensibly supportive of REDD+), do not engage with the reforms that are
necessary to effect a shift towards transformational change.
The evidence from the six countries indicates that BAU coalitions
mainly discuss international issues linked to REDD+. In Indonesia and
PNG, the most vocal BAU coalition (‘global ﬁnancial support’ in Table 2)
comprises demands by national actors for developed countries to con-
tribute ﬁnancially to support REDD+activities. In both countries, this co-
alition is dominated by state actors. In Brazil and Cameroon, the main
BAU coalition emphasises that REDD+activities should be part of a glob-
al response to climate change (‘global solution’ in Table 2). In both cases,
international and state actors are the most vocal supporters. In Vietnam,
the main BAU coalition stresses the win–win aspects of REDD+ policies
and the beneﬁts of combining REDD+with payments for environmentaltional REDD+: An analysis of the power of agency, Forest Policy and
Table 2
Reputational power of discourse coalitions.
Country Master frame Actor categories in the main BAU and TC discourse coalitions
(no. of actors’ stances expressed in the coalition)
No. of stances of
coalition actors
Reputational
power index
of discourse
coalition Rd
Normalised reputational
power index of discourse
coalition RBAU norm
RTC norm
Indonesia Global ﬁnancial support
(BAU)
State (31); Domestic NGOs and CSOs (8); International NGOs (7);
Foreign government agencies (6); Intergovernmental organisations/
international research institutes (5); National research institutes (1);
Others (8)
66 8.74 0.68
Risk of losing rights (TC) Domestic NGOs and CSOs (14); International NGOs (10); State (3);
Intergovernmental organisations/international research institutes (3);
National research institutes (1); Others (1)
32 4.18 0.32
Vietnam Win–win (BAU) State (5); Intergovernmental organisations/international research
institutes (3); Foreign government agencies (1)
9 2.57 0.65
User pays (TC) State (5) 5 1.37 0.35
Brazil Global solution (BAU) International NGOs (8); State (7); Foreign government agencies (6);
Intergovernmental organisations/international research institutes (4);
Foreign/multinational business (2); Domestic NGOs and CSOs (3);
National research institutes (2); Domestic business (1)
33 9.48 0.64
Participation of indigenous
people (TC)
Domestic NGOs and CSOs (13); International NGOs (2); State (1) 16 5.37 0.36
Cameroon Global solution (BAU) Intergovernmental organisations/international research institutes (3);
State (2); Others (1)
6 2.56 1
None 0 0 0
Nepal Global solution (BAU) Domestic NGOs and CSOs (2); National research institutes (1);
Intergovernmental organisations/international research institutes (1);
Others (2)
6 1.33 0.27
Rewarding communities
(TC)
Domestic NGOs and CSOs (5); Foreign government agencies (2); State (1);
National research institutes (1); Others (1)
10 3.53 0.73
PNG Global ﬁnancial support
(BAU)
State (14); Foreign government agencies (3); Intergovernmental
organisations/international research institutes (3); Domestic NGOs and
CSOs (2); Domestic business (1); Foreign/multinational business (1)
International NGOs (1); National research institutes (1)
26 11.00 0.51
Empowerment (TC) Domestic NGOs and CSOs (9); National research institutes (7); State (6);
International NGOs (6); Domestic business (1); Others (1)
30 10.50 0.49
BAU: Business-as-usual; TC: Transformational change.
6 M. Brockhaus et al. / Forest Policy and Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxxservices (‘win–win’ in Table 2), on the grounds that having both forest
protection anddevelopmentwould boost incomes; state actors dominate
most stances in Vietnam, which is not surprising given the state's strong
control over themedia. Only in Nepal is themain BAU coalition not dom-
inated by state actors; rather, the media coverage is led by the input of
professional forestry experts who advise journalists, and state actors
have little media presence (Khatri et al., 2012).
TC coalitions focus instead on domestic issues. In Vietnam, this coa-
lition calls for domestic users of forest environmental services to com-
pensate providers and pay for the beneﬁts they receive (‘user pays’ in
Table 2). It is the only TC coalition that is represented (exclusively) by
state actors. In all other countries, the focus of the most vocal coalition
for change is on the need to introduce REDD+ safeguards to ensure
the protection of local and indigenous rights, increased participation
and empowerment. These coalitions predominantly comprise domestic
NGOs and CSOs, followed by international NGOs; state actors are repre-
sented in limited numbers. In Indonesia, the TCmaster framewarns that
REDD+ might involve a trade-off between effectiveness (delivery of
greenhouse gas emission reductions) and equity in terms of restrictions
on access to forest, possibly leading to dispossession and threatening
local livelihoods (‘risk of losing rights’ in Table 2). In Brazil, the main
coalition for change demands increased participation by indigenous
people in decision-making on REDD+ (‘participation of indigenous
people’ in Table 2). In PNG, the focus is on empowering local communi-
ties to ensure that they can beneﬁt from REDD+ (‘empowerment’ in
Table 2). This includes providing transparent and complete information
on REDD+ in a suitable format for communities and making arrange-
ments that facilitate effective participation in decision-making, including
effective free, prior and informed consent processes. Similarly, in Nepal,
the coalition for change calls for beneﬁt-sharing schemes that reward
local and indigenous communities, particularly their poorer members
(‘reward communities’ in Table 2). All these TC coalitions have concerns
about environmental justice related to REDD+.Please cite this article as: Brockhaus, M., et al., Governing the design of na
Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.07.003In Cameroon, however, we have not been able to identify a coalition
for change. None of the master frames in Cameroon is transformational
(‘none’ in Table 2), neither in the sense of clearly addressing national
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation nor in ensuring co-
beneﬁts of REDD+. Rather, the only stance in Cameroon that starts to
address national-level REDD+ issues recognises that REDD+ will re-
quire major technical and ﬁnancial assistance. This is hardly a frame
calling for transformational change, given that it merely demands sup-
port from external actors.
Notably, the main TC coalitions in the different countries focus on
REDD+ safeguards and environmental justice issues such as protection
of local rights, empowerment and increased participation. Particularly
striking in all countries is the absence ofmaster frames directly address-
ing national drivers of deforestation and forest degradation such as ag-
ricultural expansion and logging activities. Very few actors clearly state
that reducing carbon emission from forests requires substantial national
policy reforms both within and outside the forestry sector.
4.3. Discourse and power
As mentioned above, a dominant discourse coalition has three
characteristics: central actors adopt their discourse; the coalition in-
cludes key state actors; and institutional practices reﬂect this discourse.
The coalition with the higher reputational power index within a coun-
try fulﬁls the ﬁrst of these conditions.
The two rightmost columns of Table 2 present the reputational
power index of thediscourse coalitions and their normalised equivalent.
In Vietnam, Indonesia and Brazil, the BAU coalition represents more
inﬂuential actors than the TC coalition. In Vietnam and Indonesia,
state actors clearly dominate these coalitions (fulﬁlling also the second
condition for a dominant coalition) and BAU coalitions are twice as
powerful as TC coalitions. In PNG, the BAU coalition is only slightly
more inﬂuential than the TC coalition. By contrast, in Nepal, the mosttional REDD+: An analysis of the power of agency, Forest Policy and
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three times higher than the BAU coalition.
Indonesia has the next greatest relative difference between
normalised power indices. With an index of 0.68, the BAU coalition has
a strong dominance over the coalition advocating for recognition of
local rights. Although some state actors are included in the coalition for
change, this ﬁnding supports evidence in the literature indicating strong
ongoing resistance in Indonesia to the inclusion of substantial tenure is-
sues in policy debates (Indrarto et al., 2012). In the nearly 15 years
since the fall of the Suharto regime – a period during which forest ten-
ure issues were taboo in policy discussions – the rights coalition has
made progress, yet it needs to recruitmore inﬂuential actors, particular-
ly fromwithin the state, if beneﬁts related to access and control of for-
est resources are to become ﬁxed on the REDD+ political agenda.
The relative difference in power between the BAU and TC coalitions in
Brazil differs only slightly fromthat in Indonesia. This is somewhat surpris-
ing given that recognition of indigenous rights is far more advanced in
Brazil than in Indonesia. This resultmight be partly biased by the lower re-
sponse rate to the network survey in Indonesia compared with Brazil.
However, it is also the case that, although legal recognition is advanced
in Brazil, in practice the implementation of indigenous rights is far from
uniform or complete and is still hampered by major challenges (May
et al., 2011b; Stocks, 2005). Another interpretation of these ﬁnding sug-
gests that actors lobbying for existing patterns of deforestation and deg-
radation are much stronger than any group challenging this status quo.
As noted above, in Vietnam, the state dominates both BAU and TC
coalitions, which indicate a government commitment to implementing
REDD+ activities. However, there is a need for the state to go beyond
the simplistic and rather propagandistic message that REDD+ is a
win–win policy, and engage with relevant political and institutional
challenges to deliver effective policy outcomes.
The absolute dominance of a BAU coalition in Cameroon might re-
ﬂect not only a lack of government engagement in REDD+policy devel-
opment, but also a lack of capacity amongst themedia to engage inwhat
is often perceived as a very technical policy issue. The dominance of in-
ternational actors indicates that, in practice, Cameroon is still in a very
early stage of national policy engagement with REDD+ and is not yet
tackling policy questions of how to effectively formulate and deliver a
REDD+ policy strategy.
In PNG, the BAU coalition is only slightly more powerful than the TC
coalition. In fact, the TC coalition is more vocal in the media (more TC
opinion statements are expressed). Yet the BAU coalition presents twice
as many stances by state actors, which indicates that the second condi-
tion for dominance also is not fulﬁlled for the TC coalition: authoritative
state actors tend to use BAU discourses.
Thus, out of the six countries, only in Nepal does the TC coalition dis-
play a higher reputational power index than the BAU coalition (0.73, or
nearly three times that of the BAU coalition). Although this difference is
substantial, it is not sufﬁcient to suggest that the TC coalition is in fact
dominant. The fact that only one state actor is represented in this coali-
tion indicates that the second condition for dominance is far from ful-
ﬁlled. Although TC-related issues have reached a stage of discourse
structuration in Nepal (and to a lesser extent in PNG), the lack of support
from authoritative state actors indicates that, despite being vocal, dis-
course coalitions calling for increased attention to local REDD+ beneﬁts,
community rights and local empowerment are not yet dominant.
5. Agents for change?
Powerful structural constraints and institutional path dependencies
that facilitate deforestation and forest degradation (tax regimes, devel-
opment policies, global market drivers, etc.) are present in all the coun-
tries investigated, and differ according to the main drivers, the position
of countries in the forest transition curve and the stage of the REDD+
policy process. Powerful interests in sectors outside forestry undermine
cross-sectoral cooperation, and – as indicated in Table 1 – REDD+ aimsPlease cite this article as: Brockhaus, M., et al., Governing the design of na
Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.07.003are often at oddswith national development programmes. The strongest
resistance to change occurs in countries that are characterized by high
deforestation and forest degradation rates, and is rooted in sectors
with large-scale operations, such as the plantation development inves-
tors in Indonesia and large landowners primarily involved in ranching
in Brazil, which can direct substantial resources towards inﬂuencing
the political system (Di Gregorio et al., 2012a; Indrarto et al., 2012;
May et al., 2011b). Yet, notoriously, business interests tend to lobby
behind the scenes which makes their inﬂuence ‘never easy to see’
(Weir 1996 as cited in Newell, 2000: 114). In some cases, resistance to
change is institutionalised to the point that active lobbying is no longer
necessary — these interests are already deeply entrenched in the state,
which is reﬂected in political inaction and lack of policy debates on
the key drivers of deforestation (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Bell,
1994). This could explain the relative absence of media statements
from private businesses (those engaged in activities that drive defores-
tation and forest degradation) on REDD+ in most countries and, in
countries such as Cameroon, an absence of state engagement in these
debates.
Consequently, BAU discourse coalitions reﬂect these major structur-
al constraints through the absence of references to those large-scale
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. In fact, most media dis-
course that supports BAU does not directly defend policies supporting
deforestation and forest degradation; rather, it largely ignores national
issues, focusing instead on issues in international REDD+ debates such
as international funding. In other words, what becomes ‘visible’ in
media discourse is the absence of direct challenges of deforestation
drivers, providing evidence of ‘politically enforced neglect’ (Crenson,
1971: 184). In the sameway, TC coalitions do not directly address the in-
stitutional path dependencies and policies that underlie these drivers. In-
stead, they address environmental justice issues and call for policy
reforms that support more inclusive policy processes, more equitable
REDD+beneﬁt-sharing and the defence of local rights to forest resources.
Domestic NGOs and CSOs are the main agents of change within these co-
alitions; evenwhere these coalitions aremore vocal than their BAU coun-
terparts, as inNepal and PNG, the current lack of support from state actors
leaves them unable to achieve dominance in national policy agendas.
Nevertheless, the fact that inNepal (and to a lesser extent in PNG) TC
coalitions are able to dominate the discourse in the media in part re-
ﬂects favourable structural conditions. Nepal has an institutional legacy
of very strong local forest management institutions. Compared with
other countries, community forest user groups in Nepal are extremely
well organised within a long-established federated structure with effec-
tive representation at the national level (Paudel et al., 2013). In PNG,
99% of forests are owned by customary landowners (Babon and Gowae,
2013), which puts forest resources under local control. The strength of
state-recognised local tenure rights means that policy debates cannot
ignore local demands. These ﬁndings suggest that the strengths of local
mobilisation and recognition of local rights to resources bring legitimacy
to these coalitions and translate into their ability to utilise the national
media to make their demands for the REDD+ policy process heard. This
ismore evident inNepal than in PNG,where the level of recognition of in-
digenous rights to resources in PNG is not matched by corresponding
power of local organisations.
Even where these discourse coalitions are powerful, however, they
are not necessarily dominant, nor are they guaranteed success, as two
of the necessary conditions for dominance are not fulﬁlled: ﬁrst, few
state actors support these coalitions (none in the case of Nepal) and,
second, the TC discourse has not yet been institutionalised. Consequent-
ly, TC coalitions remain forces that challenge deeply entrenched power
structures yet have few powerful allies.
On the other hand, in Vietnam, state actors dominate both BAU and
TC coalitions. However, this is more a reﬂection of the limited inclusive-
ness of the policy domain (domestic CSOs and NGOs have no voice in
public debates on REDD+) of its authoritarian regime, than of its ability
to effectively tackle drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.tional REDD+: An analysis of the power of agency, Forest Policy and
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e.g. implementing policy reforms that counter existing policies
supporting deforestation and forest degradation – entails a number
of risks and challenges. For example, increased resistance on the
part of powerful interests that support these drivers can lead to serious
conﬂicts for government as well as directly harm their own interests
(e.g. impact tax revenues, reduced electoral support). In the absence
of the implementation of alternative sustainable development policies,
it could also undermine development objectives especially in countries
strongly dependent on forest exploitation and conversion of forests to
other uses. The changes required in cross-sectoral coordination are also
challenging and as all policy reform entails trial and error, unexpected
consequences may lead to unfulﬁlled aims (Ostrom, 1999). Certainly
transformational change is a long term process, which entails learning
frompast failure and balancing development, carbon emission reductions
and livelihoods objectives through an appropriate policy mix, contextual
to each country (Borner et al., 2011).
The analysis presented here provides an initial attempt at measur-
ing the power of agency in national REDD+governance systems.Meth-
odological limitations arise because of differences between countries in
terms of the size of policy networks and in response rates. Advances in
measuring power based on network data will lead to improvements in
assessments, and further integration of quantitative and qualitative
analyses can help develop amore nuanced understanding of differences
across countries. Another limitation of this study is that we compare
only the two main discourse coalitions (1 BAU, 1 TC) in each country,
whereas more detailed and nuanced differences would likely emerge
in a more complete analysis. Despite these limitations, however, this
comparative analysis of how REDD+political processes are constituted
by the governance structures, the actors engaged in the national
policy domain, and the discursive mechanisms they employ revealed
numerous constraints and opportunities affecting efforts to move
towardsmore effective REDD+policy formulation and implementation.
6. Conclusion
Actors, existing governance structures (e.g. institutional and policy
path dependencies) and mechanisms (e.g. discursive practices) that en-
able or constrain REDD+ policy change – and the interplay between
these three governance elements – shape the direction of REDD+ policy
developments. Trajectories of change that lead away from business-as-
usual scenarios are still under development in all the countries studied,Country Master frame Actor groups in the main BAU
and TC discourse coalitions
(no. actor stances expressed
in the coalition = frequency)
No. of
coalition
actors
Indonesia (56%) Global ﬁnancial support
(BAU)
State (31) 66
Civil society (8)
International NGOs (7)
Foreign government agencies (6)
Intergovernmental org. and int.
research institutes (5)
Nat. research inst. (1)
Others (8)
Risk of losing rights
(TC)
State (3) 32
Nat. research inst. (1)
Civil society (14)
International NGOs (10)
Intergovernmental org. and int.
research institutes (3)
Others (1)
Appendix A
Please cite this article as: Brockhaus, M., et al., Governing the design of na
Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.07.003even though the REDD+ debate has sparked the emergence of a new
agency highlighting the environmental justice issues central to efforts to
shift from business as usual to transformational change. Actors that sup-
port the existing forest governance structures and that beneﬁt from insti-
tutional path dependencies are amongst the most powerful and employ
discursive practices that do not challenge these path dependencies. Of
concern for those seeking to realise a REDD+ mechanism is that the
voice of coalitions challenging BAU remains muted, and the prevailing
focus continues to be on international REDD+debates rather than on do-
mestic governance structures and related obstacles. Achieving REDD+
policy formulation and implementation therefore requires the formation
of dominant coalitions that encompass policy actors from various sectors
driving deforestation and forest degradation, with the recruitment of
powerful state actors to engage more extensively with those discourse
coalitions that are calling for transformational change. Without this,
institutionalisation of discourse for transformational change is improba-
ble, and cross-sectoral policy reforms tackling drivers of deforestation
and forest degradation are unlikely to emerge.Acknowledgements
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Rp ¼∑
np
i¼1idi
np n−1ð Þ
No. of coalition
group members ×
reputational
power index
Reputational power
index of discourse
coalition Rd = sum of
(no. of coalition group
members × reputational
power index)
Normalised
reputational
power index
of discourse
coalition
RBAU normRTC norm
0.16 4.82 8.74 0.676407
0.10 0.81
0.15 1.08
0.14 0.84
0.22 1.10
0.10 0.10
0.00 0.00
0.16 0.47 4.183 0.323593
0.10 0.10
0.10 1.45
0.16 1.59
0.21 0.62
0.00 0.00
tional REDD+: An analysis of the power of agency, Forest Policy and
(continued)
Country Master frame Actor groups in the main BAU
and TC discourse coalitions
(no. actor stances expressed
in the coalition = frequency)
No. of
coalition
actors
Reputational power
index
Rp ¼∑
np
i¼1idi
np n−1ð Þ
No. of coalition
group members ×
reputational
power index
Reputational power
index of discourse
coalition Rd = sum of
(no. of coalition group
members × reputational
power index)
Normalised
reputational
power index
of discourse
coalition
RBAU normRTC norm
Vietnam (100%) Win–win (BAU) State (5) 9 0.27 1.37 2.573411 0.653412
Intergovernmental org. and int.
research institutes (3)
0.32 0.95
Foreign government agencies (1) 0.26 0.26
User pays (TC) State (5); 5 0.27 1.37 1.365008 0.346588
Brazil (87%) Global solution
(BAU)
State (7) 33 0.30 2.09 9.475234 0.638212
Nat. research inst. (2) 0.24 0.49
Civil society (3) 0.35 1.04
Domestic business (1) 0.08 0.08
International NGOs (8) 0.29 2.33
Intergovernmental org. and int.
research institutes (4)
0.21 0.84
Foreign government agencies (6) 0.44 2.62
Foreign/multinational business (2) 0.00 0.00
Participation of
indigenous people
(TC)
State (1) 16 0.30 0.30 5.371292 0.361788
Civil society (13) 0.35 4.49
International NGOs (2) 0.29 0.58
Cameroon (66%) Global solution
(BAU)
State(2) 6 0.47 0.93 2.561847 1.00
Intergovernmental org. and int.
research institutes (3)
0.48 1.43
Others (1) 0.20 0.20
None n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Nepal (64%) Global solution (BAU) Nat. research inst. (1) 6 0.14 0.14 1.326146 0.273047
Civil society (2) 0.45 0.90
Intergovernmental org. and int.
research institutes (1)
0.28 0.28
Others (2) 0.00 0.00
Rewarding
communities (TC)
State (1) 10 0.64 0.64 3.530692 0.726953
Nat. research inst. (1) 0.14 0.14
Civil society (5) 0.45 2.26
Foreign government agencies (2) 0.24 0.49
Others (1) 0.00 0.00
PNG (68%) Global ﬁnancial
support (BAU)
State (14) 26 0.52 7.32 11.00411 0.51166
Nat. research inst. (1) 0.42 0.42
Civil society (2) 0.27 0.54
Domestic business (1) 0.18 0.18
International NGOs (1) 0.30 0.30
Intergovernmental org. and int.
research institutes (3)
0.33 0.98
Foreign/multinational
business (1)
0.22 0.22
Foreign government
agencies (3)
0.34 1.03
Empowerment (TC) State (6) 30 0.52 3.14 10.5026 0.48834
Nat. research inst. (7) 0.42 2.96
Civil society (9) 0.27 2.43
Domestic business (1) 0.18 0.18
International NGOs (6) 0.30 1.80
Others (1) 0.00 0.00
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